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Abstract
At PKC 2000, Inoue and Sakurai proposed some meth-
ods to design hash functions from block ciphers and codes
(block codes and convolutional codes). They claimed that
their hash functions are secure:      encryptions are
necessary to find a collision, where   and  are the mini-
mal distance of the code and the block size of block cipher,
respectively. However, we show in this paper that a colli-
sion could be found with about      encryptions, where 
is a small number.
1 Introduction
A hash function is a one-way function that maps an
arbitrary-length message into a fixed-length quantity. It
plays important roles in integrity protection, authentication
and signature generation. There are two basic requirements
on a secure hash function, namely, the collision resistance
property (that it is hard to find two messages with the same
hash result) and the preimage resistance property (that it is
hard to find a message corresponding to a given hash result).
There are two approaches to design hash functions. One
approach is to design customised hash functions, such as the
MD4 [10], MD5 [11] and SHA [3]. Another approach is to
design hash functions based on some existing secure crypto
algorithms (most likely, some block ciphers). A number of
hash functions based on block ciphers have been proposed.
The construction of single-block-length hash functions (the
size of the hash result is the same as the block size of the
block cipher) has been studied extensively and a synthetic
study on this issue was done by Preneel, Govaerts and Van-
dewalle [9]. The drawback of this design is that for block
cipher with small block size , the hash function is not se-
cure since a collision could be found with only about  
operations due to the birthday attack. The multiple-block-
length hash functions are thus needed. But it is not easy
to design a secure and efficient multiple-block-length hash
function. Some proposed multiple-block-length hash func-
tions are proved to be insecure: the MDC-4 [1] were broken
by Knudsen and Preneel [8]; the Parallel-DM [4] was bro-
ken by Knudsen and Lai [6]. Some multiple-block-length
hash functions remain secure but with relatively poor per-
formance [7, 8]. Inoue and Sakurai recently proposed some
multiple-block-length hash functions and claimed that their
hash functions are secure and efficient [5]. However, as will
be shown in this paper, their hash functions are not as secure
as they claimed.
We believe that with the emergence of large block size
block ciphers, such as the Rijndael with flexible block size
up to 256 bits [2], the design of secure and efficient block
cipher based hash functions could eventually be simplified.
This paper is organised as follows. Section 2 gives an
introduction to Inoue and Sakurai’s hash functions. The
cryptanalysis of Inoue and Sakurai’s block code based hash
functions and convolutional code based hash functions are
given in Section 3 and Section 4, respectively. Section 5
concludes this paper.
2 Inoue and Sakurai’s Hash Functions
Most of the hash functions are in iterated form, i.e., they
are based on the iterative computations of an easily com-
putable compression function    . The function    
compresses two binary sequences of respective lengths 
and an  into a binary sequence of length . The message
 is denoted as  -bit blocks,   



       

 (In
case the length of  is not multiple of , padding is used).
The hash result   

is obtained by computing itera-
tively


 
 


 	            
where 

is a pre-specified initial value.
The compression function of a block cipher based hash
function is constructed from a block cipher. In the rest of
this paper, we consider only the block cipher with equal key
length and block size since Inoue and Sakurai’s construc-
tions are based on this kind of block cipher. To construct a
compression function     with -bit output from a block
cipher with -bit block size, the following Davies-Mayer
function could be used:


 
 
  


 

 

 
where both 

and 

are -bit binary sequences. To
construct a hash function with   -bit    hash result
from a block cipher with -bit block size, the following
multiple Davies-Meyer function could be used.
Definition 1(Multiple Davies-Meyer Function). Let 


 
be a block cipher with -bit block size and key length.
Let 

 

        

be different instantiations of the Davies-
Meyer function, i.e., 



 

  


 


  

, obtained
by fixing log

 key bits to different values. The 

and 

are expanded by an affine mapping to the  pairs


 

. The output is the concatenation of the outputs of
the function 

 

        

.
To construct a compression function based on the multiple
Davies-Meyer function, the main task is to design the affine
mapping. In Knudsen and Preneel’s work [7, 8], non-binary
codes are used. Recently Inoue and Sakurai introduced the
block codes as well as the convolutional codes in design-
ing the affine mapping [5]. In Inoue and Sakurai’s affine
mapping, the input are  -bit message blocks (

) and 
-bit blocks of the previous iteration output 
 
but only
the message blocks 

are encoded. Their design are given
in the following two subsections.
2.1 Construction with block codes
The input to the affine mapping are the  -bit message
blocks (

) and  -bit blocks of previous hashed value

 
. The -block 

is encoded into  -bit blocks, de-
noted as 

, with the use of an     error correction
code. From 
 
and 

, form  input pairs to those 
different Davies-Meyer functions.
A typical example in [5] is given below:
Example 1. Consider the (7,4,3) Hamming code with the
following generator matrix:
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 
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is obtained as follows:
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The other block codes with higher error correction capa-
bility could also be used. It was claimed in [5] that for a
hash function constructed from an     code in this way,
about      encryptions are required to find a collision.
2.2 Construction with convolutional codes
Let the convolutional code be with parameters
   	, where , ,   and  denote the output
size, input size, minimum distance and constraint length,
respectively. The length of a message is padded to
multiple of  bits. Then    zero bits are
padded to the message. The message after padding
is denoted as 



       

, where each 

is a
-bit block. The input to the compression function
    are 
 

       

 and the -block 
 
. The

 

       

 is encoded into an -block code word,


 
	
 
	
      
	
 with the use of an    	
convolutional code. From 
 
and 

, form  input pairs
to the  different Davies-Meyer functions. The final hash
result is the concatenation of the last  iterations’ outputs

 

        
 
 

.
We give a simple example below to illustrate the opera-
tion of this kind of hash function.
Example 2. Consider a simple (2,1,3;3) binary convolu-
tional code. For each output, the following generator matrix
is used:
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
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
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is obtained as follows:
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The concatenation of the outputs of the last three iterations
are the final hash result.
It was claimed in [5] that for a hash function constructed
from an    	 convolutional code in this way, about
 
    encryptions are needed to find a collision.
3 Attack on the Hash Functions Based on
Block Codes
Inoue and Sakurai claimed that about      encryp-
tions are needed to find a collision of their hash functions
based on block codes [5]. In this section, we give an attack
to find a collision with only about       encryptions. The
flaw in Inoue and Sakusai’s design is that the differences
introduced into the -block hash output do not affect one
another in the following iterations, i.e., there is no differ-
ence propagation. It allows us to deal with those differences
separately.
Our attack is based on the following assumption:
Assumption 1. Consider a Davies-Mayer function
   


    , where 


  is a block cipher
with -bit block size and -bit key length. For two
randomly chosen  and   with    , an  satisfying
   

 exits with probability 0.368.
The following attack is to find two different messages 
and   satisfying    , where the
hash function is based on an     block code.
1. Find a -block 

so that     blocks of its
-block code word are with value zero. The posi-
tions of those non-zero blocks are denoted as 
 


 

        
 
, where   

 .
2. Randomly choose

and let 





. Then



 

and they differ at   blocks indicated by the
set 
.
3. In this step, we try to find 

 


that eliminates
the difference at the 

th block of the hash output, i.e.,
we aim at achieving 
	
 
 

	
 
(a) Find an -bit  such that 

 

	
 
  


 


	
 
 , i.e., 
	
 
 

	
 
. In case such a
collision could not be found, go to step 2, select
a different 

and repeat the attack.
(b) Choose 

such the 

th block of its code word
is , i.e., 
	
 
 .
(c) Let  

 

. Clearly,  
	
 
 
	
 
 .
Thus 
	
 
 

	
 
, i.e., 

and  

are the
desired message blocks.
4. Similar to step 2, find  



so that the difference
at the 

th block of the output is eliminated. Repeat
the similar attacks until all those   differences in the
hash output are eliminated.
5. The  and   (with only 

 


) constructed
above are with the same hash result.
We note that according to Assumption 1, the Step 3 in the
attack could succeed with about   encryptions. Thus the
total amount of computations required in this attack is about
     

.
4 Attack on the Hash Functions Based on
Convolutional Codes
Inoue and Sakurai claimed that about      encryp-
tions are needed to find a collision of their hash functions
based on convolutional codes [5]. In this section, we give
an attack to find such a collision with only about      en-
cryptions. Similar to the attack in Section 3, our attack in
this section is to eliminate the differences in the hash output
separately.
The following attack is to find two different messages
 and   satisfying    , where
the hash function is based on an    	 convolutional
code.
1. Randomly select two -block 

and  

with 





.
2. Randomly set the values of 

   	  . Let





for 	            
, i.e., at the beginning
of the  
  th iteration, the message blocks in the
memory are the same for  and  .
3. At the  
 th iteration, the only difference we need
to consider is that 


 



. In this step, we try
to eliminate the difference between the first blocks of



and  


.
(a) Find an -bit  such that 



	
  





	
 . In case such collision could not
be found, go to step 2, select a different 


and repeat the attack.
(b) Choose 


such that the first block of the
 
  th code word is , i.e., 

	
 .
(c) Let  


 


. Then  

	




	
  since 

 


for 	 
           
  . Thus 

	
 


	
.
The 


and  


are the desired message
blocks.
4. Carry out the similar attack to eliminate the remaining
differences at those    blocks of the hash output
in the next   iterations.
5. At the end of the  
 
th iteration, 









. And there is no difference in the memory.
Let 









for 	            .
6. From the   
 th iteration on, any final hash out-
puts (the concatenation of the last  hash outputs)
would be the same.
We note that according to Assumption 1, the Step 3 in the
attack could succeed with about   encryptions. Thus the
total amount of computations required in this attack is about
    

.
In addition, we point out here that the claim in [5] that
“this (the convolutional codes based hash function) reduces
the circuit complexity of the hardware-implementation
times in terms of the number of Davies-Mayers’s module
function than that based on block error correcting codes”
is misleading. The hash function, no matter it is based on
block codes or convolutional codes, could be implemented
with only one Davies-Mayer’s module function in the hard-
ware implementation. The reason is that those Davies-
Mayer functions are all based on the same block cipher.
5 Conclusions
In this paper, we show that only about     encryptions
are needed to find a collision of Inoue and Sakurai’s hash
functions based on the block codes and convolutional codes.
The claim that a collision could only be found with about
 
    encryptions is incorrect.
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